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Abstract
This paper discusses three shortcomings of the current state of the
debate regarding historical evidence against scientific realism. Attend-
ing to these issues will direct the debate away from over-generalising
wholesale arguments.
1 Introduction
The scientific realism debate is a venerable one. Recently, however, some
philosophers have grown tired of the debate, given the terms in which it is
typically construed. Magnus and Callender (2004), for example, express a
feeling of ennui afflicting the continuing dispute around scientific realism.
The debate, framed in terms of “wholesale” arguments that concern “all or
most of mature science”, is arguably irresolvable. I’m sympathetic to their
rejection of wholesale arguments, but my grounds for such rejection are very
different from those of Magnus and Callender. I don’t see reason to dismiss
the use of historical evidence in the scientific realism debate altogether,
but there are some hitherto unappreciated reasons to reconsider the way in
which historical evidence bears on the realism debate. This paper identifies
three quite general shortcomings of the current state of the realism debate
that demand further attention and will direct the debate away from over-
generalising wholesale arguments. These shortcomings are:
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1. Scantiness of case-studies: historical evidence has not been sought
extensively, open-mindedly, and across the board, partly because it is
not even clear exactly what kinds of historical case-studies matter.
2. Disparity of explanatory considerations: Realist strategies for
dealing with historical evidence are often out of sync with their basic
motivation (the Miracles argument).
3. Over generalisation: Positions in the realism debate have been
construed too rigidly and in overly general terms, ignoring the poten-
tial for domain-specific (or ‘relativized’) (anti-)realist theses.
I proceed by explicating these shortcomings in this order.
2 Scantiness of case-studies
Most realist commentaries on historical theory-shifts focus on just one or
two oft-repeated cases of potential reference invariance and ontological dis-
continuity. Most commentators have taken as their starting point Laudan’s
infamous list which, Laudan alleged, could be “extended ad nauseam”. It
seems that most of the ensuing literature has focused on tackling the cases
explicitly mentioned by Laudan, and very few case-studies have been sought
beyond the list.
Prima facie, the immense breadth of scientific enterprise over the past
couple hundred years (say) bears promise of many more cases to be discussed
in order to get a faithful overview of theory change in science. It certainly
isn’t justified to zoom in on fundamental physics, and ignore the plurality of
less fundamental theories, because physics is responsible for only a fraction of
our beliefs about the unobservable world. Contemporary philosophy science
has rightly started to pay more attention to life sciences and chemistry, for
example, in connection with issues such as explanation, scientific method,
and evidence, and there is some explicit discussion of scientific realism as
well. (Stanford 2006; Turner 2007; Weber 2005) This is the right direction,
but much more needs to be done to fully assess the historical evidence for
or against scientific realism.
Acknowledging that a much more sweeping scrutiny of the historical
record is required immediately raises important questions. For example, it
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isn’t immediately clear what kinds of cases one should be looking for as
potentially problematic for the realist. Here the debate has been bogged
down by the emphasis on ontological discontinuities and referential matters
by Kuhn, Laudan, and others. It has not yet been clearly recognised that not
all problematic cases need involve ontological discontinuities or non-referring
key terms. It is troubling enough for the realist to find past theories that
make very accurate novel predictions from false assumptions in such a way
that those assumptions are “doing the work” in producing those predictions.
These falsehoods need not concern a theory’s basic ontology, because realists’
commitments with respect to a predictively successful theory (typically) go
beyond what the theory says about the furniture of the world. The following
example serves to illustrate the issue at stake.
2.1 Kirchhoff on diffraction
A relevant case-study—documented in detail in Saatsi and Vickers (2010)—
concerns Kirchhoff’s (1882) prediction of diffraction patterns from radically
false and inconsistent premises. I will review just the gist of the case here
in order to make the point that ontology and reference can be a red herring
regarding the realism debate.
The relevant history of science, in a nutshell, goes as follows. Gustav
Kirchhoff derived a celebrated equation in the scalar diffraction theory of
optics, describing the behaviour of light with remarkable accuracy. Kirch-
hoff, like Fresnel, was operating in the ether paradigm, but this in itself is
not the cause of trouble for the realist. What’s problematic, rather, is that
from our current perspective we find that Kirchhoff’s derivation hangs on
some critical, radically false assumptions regarding the amplitude of light
waves. The realist cannot explain Kirchhoff’s success by pointing out, for
example, that ‘ether’ in Kirchhoff’s theory referred to an idle metaphysical
posit that didn’t play a role in Kirchhoff’s derivation. Although true, this
doesn’t help the realist here since the challenge is different: the problem is
the waves that Kirchhoff had in mind are too far off the target as regards
to their amplitudes.
Kirchhoff’s derivation turns on some very natural assumptions1 that he
made regarding the amplitude of light along the closed line integral pic-
1These are intuitively speaking the simplest assumptions that can be made in the
theoretical context in question.
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Figure 1: Kirchhoff’s line integral.
tured in Figure 1. In particular, he assumed that at the aperture ‘A’ the
amplitude is as if the screen did not exist, and behind the screen, ‘B’, the
amplitude and its normal derivative vanish. The crux of the matter is that
Maxwell’s theory tells us that in these areas the amplitude of the electro-
magnetic field is quite different from what Kirchhoff assumed, and we now
understand how his erroneous assumptions led him very, very close to the
right result. Our contemporary grasp on the physics and mathematics in-
volved gives us understanding of how certain radically different assumptions
about wave amplitudes can lead to practically the same end result. There is
a kind of ‘local underdetermination’ realised in Kirchhoff’s theorising about
diffraction.
Examining the theory more closely yields an understanding of its success,
but the case is fundamentally different from many other predictive successes
borne out of the research programme of ether optics: in Kirchhoff’s case
the selective realist is led intolerably astray if she optimistically commits to
those premises of Kirchhoff’s derivation that are responsible for its success.
It is impossible to explain Kirchhoff’s success in terms of his key assumptions
latching onto reality, viz. his theory being ‘approximately true’ in some sense,
even if the derivation is construed in contemporary terms that ignore the
background metaphysical assumption that the ether is the bearer of light
waves.
4
As far as scientific realism is concerned, cases such as Kirchhoff’s teach
us that sometimes the realist is led astray if she commits to those assump-
tions that are responsible for an impressively successful prediction. Most
importantly, historical cases in which this can happen need not involve non-
referring terms or radical ontological discontinuity. It is enough that the
‘success-fuelling’ assumptions are radically wrong about such matters as,
for example, what amplitudes of light waves are responsible for producing
such-and-such a diffraction pattern.
How common is this type of ‘error-tolerance’ in science, where some
set of natural, simple, yet radically false assumptions lead to essentially
the same outcome as a much more complicated theory that is worthy of
realist commitment? I don’t think we can comfortably answer this question,
and this is a shortcoming of the current state of debate. To find examples
of successful theories which are not even approximately true one does not
need to look for cases of ontological and referential change. This increases
dramatically the scope for finding potentially problematic cases.2
There are a number of responses that the realist can make to the Kirch-
hoff case, and it certainly shouldn’t be viewed as supporting any kind of
wholesale anti-realism. Nevertheless, historical cases of this kind are evid-
entially probative in evaluating the viability of different realist positions.
The case, in and of itself, doesn’t speak strongly against the idea that
through science we get to know the central features of the world, such as
light having a wave-like nature, for example. But scientific knowledge-claims
go well beyond such central features in their specificity, and assert things
such as “according to the theory the amplitude of light is such-and-such
thereabouts”. The realist who takes such claims seriously on the grounds of
highly successful predictions can be challenged by cases such as Kirchhoff’s,
which unequivocally demonstrates that occasionally, at least, the simplest,
most natural assumptions have led scientists to very impressive predictions
despite being radically false.
2Some successful predictions in old quantum theory may furnish other useful examples
of this ilk.
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3 Disparity of explanatory considerations.
The basic motivation for scientific realism (about theories) is the Miracles
argument. The second shortcoming of the current debate has to do with the
fact that some key aspects of contemporary realist positions are out of sync
with this basic motivation. There are two quite different ways in which this
shortcoming is exemplified.
1. Most realist strategies designed to deal with historical discontinuities
do not adequately show that the sorts of continuities found underlying
historical discontinuities can actually furnish a realist explanation of
past predictive successes.
2. A different problem, concerning shifting explanations and explanatory
virtues, emerges with the ‘explanationist’ defence of wholesale realism.
This problem harks back to the unresolved challenge of methodological
incommensurability which is in tension with the realist’s appeal to
explanatory virtues as justificatory virtues.
3.1 Explaining past predictive successes
Many recent realist positions can be criticised for not being able to explain
the successes of past theories any better than a competing anti-realist ex-
planation does. The fact that many realists do not pay due attention to
the way in which their position “explains” the predictive successes of past
theories is in grave variance with the basic motivation of realism: the idea
that that such successes would be “miraculous” if not explained in realist
terms.
In order to make this point I will revisit some realist responses to the
radical theory-shift from Fresnel’s ether theory to Maxwell electromagnet-
ism. The lesson to be learned is that finding continuity between subsequent
theories isn’t enough for realism: the kind of content found to be continuous
across a theory-shift should also be suitably explanatory.
Exhibit A. Worrall’s structural realism. Worrall’s structural realism,
following Poincare, finds evidence for structural continuity in the shift from
Fresnel to Maxwell.
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There was an important element of continuity in the shift from
Fresnel to Maxwell . . . There was continuity or accumulation ...
of form or structure, not of content.
This . . . seems to offer the only hopeful way of both underwriting
the ‘no miracles’ argument and accepting an accurate account
of . . . theory change in science.
It is no miracle that [Fresnel’s] theory enjoyed the predictive suc-
cess it did . . . because . . . it attributed to light the right structure.
The [electromagnetic] field in no clear sense approximates the
ether, but disturbances in it do obey formally similar laws to
those obeyed by elastic disturbances in a mechanical medium.
Thus, if we restrict ourselves to the level of mathematical equa-
tions . . . there is complete continuity. . .
Fresnel’s theory [made correct predictions] because it had ac-
curately identified certain relations between optical phenomena.
The [correspondence] principle applies purely at the mathemat-
ical level, and is compatible with theoretical assumptions being
entirely [different].
Worrall (1989)
There has been much discussion of structural realism’s vices and vir-
tues. Here I want to focus on the following aspect that has received less no-
tice. After appropriately appreciating the fact that a realist position should
‘underwrite’ the Miracles argument, Worrall tries to account for Fresnel’s
predictive success by saying that it is explained by the fact that Fresnel
attributed to light the right structure. This continuity in structure, in turn,
is explicated in terms of ‘formally similar laws’ and ‘mathematical equa-
tions’, expressing ‘relations between optical phenomena’. The case in point
is the complete continuity from Fresnel to Maxwell in the so-called Fresnel’s
equations, expressing relative intensities of reflected and refracted polarized
7
light.
Has Worrall done justice to the realist’s main motivation, the Miracles
argument? I think not. Continuity in Fresnel’s equations—expressing ‘re-
lations between optical phenomena’— provides little more than an illusion
of explanation of Fresnel’s success, comparable with Molière’s virtus dorm-
itiva. Fresnel’s predictive success is explained by the fact that he manages
to derive the right equation from his theoretical assumptions concerning the
nature of light. But the real miracle—how Fresnel managed to derive the
right equation from his theoretical assumptions—is thereby left wholly un-
explained! To provide an explanation that satisfies the realist intuition one
needs to look at the actual derivation that Fresnel employed and the role that
Fresnel’s theoretical assumptions played in that derivation, and to find suit-
able continuity between that derivation and Maxwell’s theory. It turns out
that a requisite level of continuity exists, but talk of formal/mathematical
structures doesn’t begin to capture it. (Cf. Saatsi (2005) for an account.)
Exhibit B. Chakravartty’s semirealism. Anjan Chakravartty, follow-
ing Worrall, also focuses purely on continuity in Fresnel’s equations, and
ignores all the theoretical assumptions that Fresnel needed to derive these
equations. Chakravartty’s (2007) semirealism differs fromWorrall in the way
he interprets Fresnel’s equations as ‘getting the structure right’. Chakrav-
artty reads Fresnel’s equations as describing relations between certain dispositions—
the so-called ‘detection properties’—that are required to give a ‘minimal
interpretation’ of these equations. More generally, it is recommended that
The realist should expect to retain only those structures required
to give a minimal interpretation of the mathematical equations
used to describe well-established practices of detection, interven-
tion, manipulation, and so on.
Chakravartty (2007)
Fresnel’s equations fit the bill, since they describe how one can ma-
nipulate light beams of different intensities by reflection and refraction.
Chakravartty, too, appreciates the realist’s need to underwrite the Miracles
argument. He tries to accounts for Fresnel’s success by the fact that Fresnel
managed to latch onto the relations between some crucial detection proper-
ties (‘a concrete structure’).
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Given a knowledge of concrete structures it is no miracle . . . that
good scientific theories are empirically successful, for they de-
scribe the structures of reality. (Ibid.)
Again, the worry is that semirealism fails to provide a bona fide explana-
tion of Fresnel’s success in a way that satisfies realist intuitions. Admittedly
Chakravartty’s metaphysics does furnish an explanation of sorts for why
Fresnel’s theory made right predictions; it made right predictions because
the equations that Fresnel managed to derive encode light’s disposition to
behave in a certain way under certain circumstances, entailing the predic-
tions. Fresnel’s theory made right predictions simply by virtue of latching
onto these dispositions. This is an explanation, but a superficial one at that,
and goes little beyond an alternative empiricist explanation that proceeds
in terms of Fresnel’s theory being empirically adequate.3 The realist’s Mir-
acles argument sets forth a deeper explanatory request, however, for the
real “miracle” surely is how Fresnel’s prima facie false theoretical assump-
tions about the nature of light allowed him to latch onto those dispositions
(or empirical adequacy, for that matter). This is left wholly unaccounted
for by Chakravartty’s story. To explain away that miracle, it isn’t enough
to focus on Fresnel’s equations; one needs to look at Fresnel’s theoretical
assumptions and the way in which Fresnel arrived at those equations.
Exhibit C. Ramsey-sentence realism à la Cruse & Papineau. Pierre
Cruse and David Papineau (2002) have advocated a version of Ramsey-
sentence realism according to which ‘the empirical success of scientific the-
ories can adequately be explained by appeal to the approximate truth of
their Ramsey-sentences.’ They argue that the referential success or other-
wise of the key terms in a theory is irrelevant to whether or not the theory’s
success can be explained in realist terms. This is correct, I think. But the
way in which they claim to be able to explain a past theory’s success seems
wrong.
Faced with an empirically successful theory, the realist can argue,
not to the approximate truth of the theory itself, but to the
approximate truth of its Ramsey-sentence. (p. XX, my emphasis)
3Chakravartty’s explanation in terms of dispositions is metaphysically loaded, of course.
But this in itself does not make it a realist explanation that lives up to the intuition behind
the Miracles argument.
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The idea is that the approximate truth of a theory’s Ramsey-sentence
explains its success, and the critical notion of ‘the approximate truth of a
Ramsey-sentence’ is then (somewhat vaguely) explicated as the requirement
that existential quantifiers of a Ramsey-sentence pick out something in the
world which has most of the properties and relations attributed to it by the
Ramsey-sentence. For example:
Suppose “the aether” fails to refer to anything. Then there is
no question of the aether possessing any properties, approxim-
ately or otherwise. But this does not preclude the assessment of
the relevant existential Ramsey-sentence for approximate truth.
It could be approximately true that there is an entity which is
the seat of electromagnetic phenomena, and involves transverse
radiation, and . . . consists of an elastic solid. After all, there is
indeed something which is the seat of electromagnetic phenom-
ena, and involves transverse radiation, and so on—namely, the
electromagnetic field—even if it is not an elastic solid.
This proposal is problematic from the word ‘go’. The explication of the
approximate truth of a Ramsey-sentence does nothing to ensure that the
properties and relations that get carried over in theory change are actually
explanatory of the predecessor theory’s success. That is, it is possible that
(i) two theories agree on most things they say about some unobservable
entity-type, but that (ii) it turns out that the disagreements are critical for
explaining the predecessor theory’s predictive success, whilst the agreements
are more or less immaterial for that explanation.4
* * *
To sum up, the lesson to draw from the above review of recent realist
positions is this. It isn’t enough for the realist to find a way to capture
continuity across theory-shifts. One also needs to keep the basic realist
motivation firmly in mind and make sure that any continuity found in theory
change underwrites a bona fide explanation of the relevant past successes.
4For example, the fact that Fresnel construed light as wave motion of the ether turns
out to be somewhat immaterial for understanding how Fresnel managed to derive his
equations. (Saatsi, 2005)
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3.2 Shifting explanations and explanatory virtues
Even if we can find continuity in radical theory-shifts that furnishes a realist
explanation of past predictive successes, these theory-shifts may still pose a
problem for the Miracles argument. The reason is that in many instances of
theory change there is radical discontinuity in the explanations that the re-
spective theories give of their target phenomena. The Miracles argument is
often portrayed as being on a par with various scientific instances of inference
to the best explanation. Anti-realists who are sceptical of scientific IBEs cri-
ticise the argument as question begging (e.g. Laudan, 1981). In response,
some realists have defended the Miracles argument as being “merely” rule-
circular, as opposed to premise-circular (Psillos, 1999). Regardless of the
outcome of that debate, the realist must acknowledge that there is still a sig-
nificant, undeniable sense in which inference to the best explanation has led
to the wrong conclusion many times in the history of science. The existence
of the ether that waves thus-and-so was the best explanation of diffraction
phenomena. The existence of the caloric with such-and-such properties was
the best explanation of the speed of sound. And so on. The ‘selective’ real-
ist’s strategy—the famous ‘divide et impera’ move—of focusing selectively
on those elements of past theories that both (i) get carried over in theory
change, and (ii) are explanatory of past predictive successes from our current
perspective, completely fails to address this issue of discontinuity with re-
spect to scientific explanations. (cf. Doppelt, 2005) If the Miracles argument
is defended as being on a par with scientific IBEs, then it seems that the
best the realist can say is that the conclusion of the Miracles argument—the
explanans of this particular instance of inference to the best explanation—is
latching onto reality to the extent that is required to explain its predictive
success. And the obvious worry now is that the realist hypothesis makes no
empirical predictions different from those made by an alternative anti-realist
hypothesis that says, for example, that scientific IBEs and predictive success
are a sign of empirical adequacy.5
5This tension between the explanationist defence of realism, on the one hand, and the
selective realist response to the history of science, on the other, has been noted by Doppelt
2005. His recent novel twist on the explanationist defence of realism is premised on the
assumption that part of the explanandum of the Miracles argument is the explanatory
success of science. (Doppelt 2007) From my perspective past explanations in terms of the
ether or the caloric, for example, were not successful, since they were false. More would
have to be said on this, of course, to fully respond to Doppelt’s subtle argument.
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There is a further dimension to this challenge to the Miracles argument,
due to the fact that arguably there are also shifts in the explanatory vir-
tues (in addition to shifts in particular scientific explanations). (E.g. de
Regt and Dieks, 2005) Acknowledgment of such “meta-level” discontinuities
harks back to Kuhn’s discussions of paradigm shifts and methodological in-
commensurability, of course. Over the last couple of decades the scientific
realism debate has been mainly driven by Laudan’s challenge to realism—
formulated in terms of reference variance—according to which the history
of science allegedly shows that predictive success is not correlated with the-
ories’ approximate truth. The selective realist’s response to that challenge
has been quite convincing on the whole, I think, but a broadly Kuhnian
challenge remains. If the history of science really displays transitions from
one explanatory paradigm to another—shifts on how explanations are evalu-
ated and compared6—then the meta-inductive support for the Miracles argu-
ment is weakened yet further. For arguably the best scientific thinkers of one
paradigm often fail to appreciate the explanations that are deemed to be the
best explanations by scientists operating within a different methodological
paradigm. In light of this, the realist’s preference for her explanation of the
predictive success of science is naturally understood in terms of the realist
occupying a different “paradigm” from her opponent. The realist may feel
that she is able to objectively compare different explanations for the success
of science, but why would a philosopher of science be in a different epistemic
boat from the scientist, as a cognitive agent evaluating IBEs? After all, the
realist’s (rule-circular) defence of the Miracles argument underlines the fact
that in relation to the IBE-reliant method of science the Miracles argument
is just “more of the same”.
It may well be possible to construct a good argument on the basis of
the Miracles intuition, but one lesson from the history of science is that
this cannot be achieved simply by arguing that IBE is a reliable mode of
inference as testified by its role in successful scientific reasoning.
4 Over-generalisation
Philosophers like to make sweeping generalisations and often hope to find
far-reaching and exhaustive uniformity in the world. Regularly it turns out,
6Examples here....
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however, that such hopes are in vain as allegedly uniform subject matters
break down into a plurality of cases each one of which requires individual
attention to detail. Like so many other problems in philosophy, the ques-
tion of realism has been posed in extremely general terms at the outset,
and considerations such as the Miracles argument have been put forward in
the hope to secure realism about “all or most of mature science” in one fell
swoop. I will now propose that the realism debate can progress by renoun-
cing such extreme level of generality in its arguments and acknowledging
the heterogeneity and the multifaceted nature of theoretical science, and by
studying our epistemic commitments in a more piecemeal way.
David Papineau suggests a piecemeal approach to the realism debate in
his introduction to (Papineau, ed., 1996).
One issue ... is whether different philosophical morals may apply
in different areas of science. Perhaps we should be fundamental-
ists in physics but not biology. Or perhaps we should be theory
realists in chemistry, entity realists in geology, and outright scep-
tics in paleobiology. ... Perhaps a more fine-grained approach
would be worth the extra effort. Now that we are clear about
the epistemological options on offer, there is no obvious reason
why we should expect the same alternative to apply to every
scientific discipline.
(Papineau, 1996)
Papineau’s suggestion makes perfect sense but for some reason it hasn’t
been widely heralded in the literature; as far as I can see, neither Papineau
nor anyone else has been willing to put in ‘the extra effort’. Rather, differ-
ent forms of realism and anti-realism are typically presented as epistemic
positions that are applicable across the board. But one can go even further
than Papineau does in the above quote, and argue that there is reason not
to expect the same alternative to apply to every scientific discipline. I’ll fin-
ish the paper with some remarks to this end vis-a-vis the issue of historical
evidence.
It is critical to acknowledge that scientific enterprise on the whole ex-
hibits variation in many respects relevant for the realism debate. There are
substantial features of explanatory practice and evidential considerations
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in science that differ from one scientific domain to another. For example,
explanation in molecular biology and neuroscience, say, is arguably a mat-
ter of producing suitable causal-mechanical accounts, whilst in fundamental
physics much of explanation is non-causal.7 When it comes to linking evid-
ential considerations to explanatory value (IBE), it may well be that more
abstract non-causal explanations of quantum physics, say, are much less
reliable in tracking the truth compared to causal-mechanistic explanations.
Given a particular domain of scientific theorising, with particular desiderata
for good explanation, we may look for historical evidence for the unreliabil-
ity (or otherwise) of IBE within that domain. Perhaps an extensive overview
of the historical record will show that practically all cases that speak against
the Miracles intuition pertain to specific domains of science, indicating that
a degree of pessimism is well justified with respect to our current theoretical
beliefs in these domains. Perhaps we will come to understand—by reflect-
ing on the methods and subject matters of these domains—how prima facie
impressive predictive success (eliciting the Miracles intuition) is actually
quite achievable from radically false premises due to a kind of local under-
determination. Kirchhoff’s prediction is a case in point here. (Saatsi and
Vickers, 2010)
The problem of over-generalisation stems from careless extrapolation
from a very limited number of historical case-studies. It should be easy
to appreciate the basic intuition that a case-study that concerns a model
of cosmology that has made impressive novel predictions from apparently
false assumptions—should such a case be discovered—might not speak at
all against realism about molecular genetics, given the obvious differences
in the respective domains. We can battle over-generalisation in the realism
debate by forming and arguing for more tightly delineated philosophical po-
sitions. In practice this requires that the basic arguments for and against
realism—including the arguments turning on historical evidence—get rela-
tivized to particular domains of science with their particular subject matters,
problems, and methods. Instead of defending “(anti-)realism about all (or
most) mature science” one should focus one’s ambitions to “(anti-)realism
of kind K about theoretical beliefs supported by evidence of type E in a
domain D”, where the variables allow for variability in features that support
7Cf. Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) and Craver (2007) versus Bokulich (2008), for
example.
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more nuanced treatment of historical and philosophical evidence.
References
Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Explanation: The Mechanist Al-
ternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of the Biological and Bio-
medical Sciences, 36:421–441.
Bokulich, A. (2008). Can Classical Structures Explain Quantum Phenom-
ena? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59(2):217–235.
Chakravartty, A. (2007). A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Craver, C. F. (2007). Explaining the Brain. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Cruse, P. and Papineau, D. (2002). Scientific Realism Without Reference. In
Marsonet, M., editor, The Problem of Realism, pages 174–189. Ashgate,
Aldershot.
De Regt, H. W. and Dieks, D. (2005). A Contextual Approach to Scientific
Understanding. Synthese, 144:137–170.
Doppelt, G. (2005). Empirical success or explanatory success: What
does current scientific realism need to explain? Philosophy of Science,
72(5):1076–1087.
Doppelt, G. (2007). Reconstructing scientific realism to rebut the pessimistic
meta-induction. Philosophy of Science, 74(1):96–118.
Laudan, L. (1981). A Confutation Of Convergent Realism. Philosophy of
Science, 48:19–49.
Magnus, P. and Callender, C. (2004). Realist ennui and the base rate fallacy.
Philosophy of Science, 71(3):320–338.
Papineau, D. (1996). Introduction. In Papineau, D., editor, The Philosophy
of Science, chapter 1, pages 1–21. Oxford University Press.
Psillos, S. (1999). Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. Routledge,
London. Ch.4.
Saatsi, J. and Vickers, P. (2010). Miraculous success? Inconsistency and
untruth in Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory. The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science. Forthcoming.
15
Saatsi, J. T. (2005). Reconsidering the Fresnel-Maxwell case study. Studies
in History and Philosophy of Science, 36:509–538.
Stanford, K. P. (2006). Exceeding Our Grasp. Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Turner, D. (2007). Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific
Realism Debate. Cambridge University Press.
Weber, M. (2005). Philosophy of Experimental Biology. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge.
Worrall, J. (1989). Structural Realism: The Best Of Both Worlds? Dialect-
ica, 43:99–124. Reprinted in Papineau, D. (ed.) The Philosophy of Science
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 139 âĂŞ 165.
16
